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LEGISLATIVE NOTES 
THE ECONOMIC IMPAC'r 
DISCLOSURE ACT 
State administrative agencies have substantial power to regulate 
the economic transactions of private individuals. 1 Since the applic-
able statutory guidelines are often vague or ambiguous, agencies 
enjoy considerable discretion in their exercise of that power. 2 
Certain doctrines have been developed to limit the discretion of 
regulatory agencies, notably an insistence on procedural 
safeguards and a requirement that the agency have substantial 
evidence to support its factfinding. 3 Yet, these doctrines have not 
been a sufficient check on the discretion of the administrative 
agencies. 
While the traditional concern with agency discretion is that 
agency decision-making will be biased in favor of the regulated 
industries, 4 agencies are also criticized for failing to investigate the 
impact of their policies on the regulated client and the resulting 
cost to consumers. 5 This failure prevents the agency from respond-
ing adequately to the legitimate interests of either tbe business 
' Examples of the various types of state agencies can be found in I F. CooPER,' STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (1965). Although many state agencies are not directly concerned 
with regulating private economic transactions. this note focuses upon the effect of the 
Economic Impact Disclosure Act, see Part II infra, on state agencies acting in their 
regulatory capacities. 
2 State courts have been more willing to strike down broad delegations of power to 
administrative agencies than have the federal courts. See I F. CooPER, supra note I, at 
31-91. Yet, Cooper concludes that "almost any extent of discretionary power may be 
delegated if public safety is significantly involved. and if there is need for the exercise of an 
expert judgment which the agency undoubtedly possesses, and if its procedures afford fair 
hearings. and adequate judicial review is provided." Id. at 91. 
3 See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1681-88 (I 975). 
4 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-47 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
Thill Sec. Corp. v. New Yori( Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264,273 (7th Cir. 1970); Moss v. CAB, 
430 F.2d 891. 902 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: 
A Reevaluation. 67 HARV. L. REV. I 105, 1107-13 (1954); Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators 
and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1975). 
5 The Florida Economic Impact Disclosure Act of 1975, ch. 76-1, § I, 1976 Fla. Laws I 
(repealed by Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 76-276, § 5, 1976 Fla. Laws 750). See note 55 infra: 
Kennedy, Regulatory Reform: A Confused National Issue, 28 Ao. L. REV. 447 (1976); 
Ribicoff, Congressional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 Ao. L. REv. 415, 416-17 
(1976); S\:hwartz, The Deregulation of Industry: A Built-In Bias, 51 IND. L.J. 718, 719 
(1976). . 
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community or consumers. This note examines a recently de-
veloped procedure designed to improve the agency decision-
making process by requiring economic prediction of the effect 
which agency activities will have prior to agency action. 
In particular, this note examines three issues. Part II focuses on 
whether requiring a detailed economic impact statement,6 applica-
ble to all state agencies, establishes an appropriate method for 
generating and disclosing relevant economic information to agency 
decision makers and the public. Part III discusses whether 
economic analysis provides an objective technique which can ef-
fectively limit the discretionary powers of state administrative 
af,encies. Part IV evaluates the probable impact of this economic 
information upon the agency decision-making process. This note 
concludes that a formal, judicially reviewable procedure for pre-
dicting economic impacts is not justified given its considerable 
costs and its limited potential either for reducing agency discretion 
or for increasing agency responsiveness. 
I. IMPACT STATEMENTS 
An impact statement is a procedural mechanism designed to 
improve agency decision-making and to limit agency discretion. It 
differs from other legislative controls over administrative action, 
such as a legislative veto or committee oversight, since it pre-
scribes procedures for agency evaluation of the proposed action 
and consideration of possible alternatives rather than relying upon 
legislative review of a final agency action. A prescriptive limitation 
of this type should be more effective than other techniques· of 
legislative control since it alleviates the inability of the legislature 
to review effectively more than a handful of the agency's actions. 7 
" As examples of bills imposing a broad-ranging requirement of economic ·analysis and 
disclosure, this note examines a Florida bill which was passed and subsequently repealed 
and a similar bill considered in Michigan. See text accompanying notes 24-27 infra. · 
7 Effective legislative oversight of the activities of administrative agencies is rare because 
of the complexity of the subject matter, the lack of adequate staff. the inaccessibility of 
independent information, and the lack of political benefits from participation in oversight 
activities. Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function. 23 KAN. L. 
REv. 277, 281-83 (1975). For a brief discussion of some recent proposals to insure more 
effective congressional oversight over the federal regulatory bureaucracy. see Ribicoff, 
supra note 5, at 421-27. 
Florida and Michigan both provide for committee oversight over proposed administrative 
rules. For a description of the history and present operation of the oversight process in the 
two states. see Note, Can the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee Adequately Solve 
Administrative Conflict?. 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 350, 350~51, 357-58 (1976). 
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The pioneering effort in impact statements was the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 8 NEPA requires all 
federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement 
before undertaking any activity which will have significant en-
vironmental consequences. 9 By requiring preparation prior to 
agency activity, Congress sought to provide decision-makers with 
detailed information as an aid in determining whether to proceed 
with a program or project, and to disclose to the public relevant 
environmental information on proposed agency activity .10 
Fulfilling these dual purposes requires an elaborate series of 
steps in the preparation of environmental impact statements. The 
federal agencies must develop criteria for identifying those actions 
likely to require environmental impact statements.11 If the agency 
determines that a contemplated project requires the preparation of 
a statement, a draft environmental impact statement must be pre-
pared.12 The draft statement is then reviewed by other federal and 
state agencies and made available for public comment. 13 The final 
environmental impact statement is then prepared with the agency 
8 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). 
• NEPA requires all agencies of the federal government to: 
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, 
a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
42 U .S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). . 
10 Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974); Calvert Cliffs' Coord. 
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
11 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1975); Baum, Canary, Reeve & Scott, Negative 
NEPA: The Decision Not to File, 6 ENv. LAW 309 (1976). 
12 The Council on Environmental Quality's guidelines offer an optimistic appraisal of the 
role of draft environmental impact statements in the decision-making process. 
It is important that draft environmental impact statements be prepared and 
circulated for comment ... as early as possible in the agency review process in 
order to permit agency decision-makers and outside reviewers to give meaningful 
consideration to the environmental issues involved. In particular, agencies should 
keep in mind that such statements are to serve as the means of assessing the 
environmental impact of proposed agency actions, rather than as a justification for 
decisions already made. This means that draft statements on administrative actions 
should be prepared and circulated for comment prior to the first significant point of 
decision in the agency review process. 
40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1975). Others have questioned whether these guidelines are an 
accurate reflection of the actual agency decision-making process. See notes 19-21 and 
accompanying text infra. 
13 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9 (1975). 
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responding to the questions and criticism raised in the reviewing 
process. 14 
Judicial review of the final environmental impact statement as-
sures the integrity of the process. The courts have been quite strict 
with federal agencies, invalidating agency proposals for failure to 
prepare a statement, 15 for failure to consider impacts in sufficient 
detail, 16 for improperly segmenting a project, 17 and for failure to 
consider alternatives in an adequate•fashion. 18 Environmentalists 
have effectively used litigation to assure agency compliance with 
the procedural requirements of NEPA. 
Despite the expenditure of substantial agency resources both in 
statement preparation and in litigation, it is not clear that environ-
mental impact statements have caused agency decision-making to 
be more responsive to environmental concerns. 19 Commentators 
have noted that the environmental impact statement has not stimu-
lated inquiry into possible alternatives, but has been offered as a 
post hoc justification for the agency's decision. 20 Rather than ren-
dering the federal decision-making process more responsive, the 
environmental impact statement requirement has consumed con-
siderable agency resources and has often caused environmentalists 
to expend their resources focusing on the procedure of statement 
preparation rather than on the substantive decision. 21 
1• 40 C.F.R. § 1500.10 (1975). 
1
• Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973); Green County 
Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
16 Ecology Center of La., Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975); Prince George's 
County v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1975). 
17 The problem of improper segmentation seems to be endemic to highway programs. See, 
e.g., Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973); Thompson v. Fugate, 
347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
18 Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see generally 
Note, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: What "Alternatives" Must an 
Agency Discuss?, 12 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 221 (1976). 
19 Andrews, Agency Response to NEPA: A Comparison and Implications, 16 NAT. RES. 
J. 301 (1976); Cramton & Berg, On Leading A Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal 
Bureaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511 (1973); Friesma & Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, 
and the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16 NAT. RES. J. 339 (1976); Jordan, 
Alternatives Under NEPA: Toward an Accommodation, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705 (1973); Sax, 
The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973); Strohbehn, NEPA's 
Impact on Federal Decisionmaking: Examples of Noncompliance and Suggestions for 
Change, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 93 (1974); Comment, Four Years of Environmental Impact 
Statements: A Review of Agency Administration of NEPA, 8 AKRON L. REv. 545 (1975); 
Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act Applied to Policy-Levei Decisionmak-
ing, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799 (1973). 
20 Jordan, supra note 19, at 724; Comment, Four Years of Environmental Impact State-
ments: A Review of Agency Administration of NEPA, S AKRON L. REV. 545, 558 (1975). 
21 Fairfax, A Disaster in the Environmental Movement: An Essay on the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (unpublished manuscript). 
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Despite criticism of the effectiveness of the environmental im-
pact statement process, legislators have increasingly turned to the 
impact statement as a method to limit the discretion exercised by 
administrative agencies. While there have been recent federal in-
novations,22 the most notable expansion of the concept has come 
at the state level. Several states have considered, and a few states 
have passed, proposals which would require economic impact 
statement (EclS) preparation prior to certain types of legislative 
and administrative actions. 23 
22 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 
94-140, § I, 89 Stat. 751 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 136d (1970)) (requires the EPA, prior to the 
cancellation of a registration of a pesticide, to consider the impact of that action upon the 
agricultural economy); Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 2, 88 
Stat. 1706 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970)) (requires a competitive impact statement to be 
filed along with a proposed consent decree in a civil antitrust proceeding); Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(d), 88 
Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U .S.C. § 57a (Supp. V 1975)) (requires the FTC t_o prepare, prior to 
promulgation, an economic assessment of the effect of a rule defining unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 
204, 90 Stat. 2743 (to be codified in 43 U .S.C. § 1714) (requires a statement as to the 
economic impact of a withdrawal of public land); S. 4260, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. 
REc. 22253 (1974) (requires preparation of a competitive impact statement for proposed 
legislation and major Federal actions significantly affecting competition in certain desig-
nated industries); Exec. Order No. I 1,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,502 (1974) (required legislation 
and proposed rules to be accompanied by a certificate stating that the inflationary impact of 
the proposal has been evaluated). 
23 The following proposals for an analysis of the economic impact of various actions have 
been enacted: California Ass. Con. Res. 133, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1976) (legislative analyst to 
prepare a statement evaluating the effect of a pending bill on employment), and Ass. Con. 
Res. 211, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. ( 1976) (legislative analyst to prepare a statement analyzing the 
cost to citizens of pending bills); The Florida Economic Impact Disclosure Act of 1975, ch. 
76-1, 1976 Fla. Laws I (requiring an economic impact statement to be prepared prior to 
agency action, see Part II infra), repealed by Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 76-276, § 5, 1976 Fla. 
Laws 750 (limited the preparation of economic impact statements to agency rules); Act of 
September 5, 1975, Pub. A. 79-790, 1975 Ill. Laws 2455 (amending ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 
111-½, § 1006 (1973)) (requires an economic impact statement to be prepared for certain 
existing and proposed rules and regulations of the Pollution Control Board); Act of May 23, 
1975, ch. 688, § 4, 1975 Nev. Stats. 1387 (amending NEv. REv. STAT. § 218.2725 (1973)) 
(requires the preparation of a fiscal note for bills having a financial impact on a local 
government); Act of March 28, 1975, ch. 15, 1975 S.D. Sess. Laws 40 (codified in S.D. 
COMPILED LAWS ANN.§ 1-26-4.2 (1976 Supp.)) (requires a fiscal note stating the effect of a 
proposed rule on the revenues, expenditures, or fiscal liability of the state or its subdivi-
sions); Act of March 24, 1976, ch. 117, 1975-76 2d Ex. Sess. Wash. Laws 414 (requires state 
and local governmental entities with rule-making authority to adopt procedures to insure 
that economic values are given appropriate consideration). 
The following proposals to require various types of economic analysis were considered: 
Indiana S.B. 414, 99th Cen. Ass. (1976) (would require the legislative council to develop 
criteria for determining which legislative proposals shall be subject to the preparation of 
impact statements detailing the cost to citizens of the proposed action); Michigan H.B. 6423, 
78 Legis., Reg. Sess. (1976) (discussed in detail in Part II infra); Michigan S.B. 1008 and 
S.B. 1074, 78th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1976) (would require an economic impact statement for 
proposed legislation and administrative rules); New York A.B. 9343, 199th Sess. (1976) 
(would require an EcIS for proposed agency rules and regulations); Pennsylvania S.B. 1248, 
Session of 1975 (would mandate a study of the costs and benefits of environmental protec-
tion and pollution control statutes); Pennsylvania H.B. 1557, Session of 1975 (would require 
an EcIS to be prepared for proposed bills and regulations dealing with environmental 
protection o_r pollution control); Pennsylvania H.B. 2052, Session of 1976 (would create a 
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This note examines Florida H.B. 874,24 which was passed by the 
state legislature and repealed shortly thereafter, and Michigan 
H.B. 6423,25 which was considered by the Michigan legislature in 
1976.26 Both bills are entitled the Economic Impact Disclosure Act 
and, except for a few provisions, they are identical. 27 These bills 
would apply. to more types of administrative agency activity and 
would require more factors to be considered in the assessment of 
economic impact than do existing statutes or other proposed bills. 
Thus, the Economic Impact Disclosure Act is a particularly useful 
vehicle for examining the virtues and faults of legislation mandat-
ing a formal procedure for economic analysis within the agency 
decision-making process. 
II. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT DISCLOSURE ACT 
A. General Provisions 
The Act expands and formalizes the procedure by which ad-
ministrative agencies assess the probable economic effects of their 
actions. Although most agencies currently analyze the economic 
effect of proposed actions,28 the bills would standardize the proce-
dure for all state agencies. The basic statutory command is that 
"Every agency, in advance of agency action, shall justify its pro-
posed action by preparing an economic impact statement using 
professionally accepted· methodology, with quantification of data 
to the extent possible giving effect to both short- and long-term 
consequences. " 29 
1. Scope-Two definitions reveal the breadth of the statutory 
requirement of EcIS preparation. •~ Agency" is defined to include 
state departments, boards, commissions, and any other agency in, 
Joint Legislative Committe~ on Regulatory Reform to conduct an economic analysis of state 
economic regulatory activity). Copies of these bills are on file with the UNIVERSITY OF 
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM. 
See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATIVE 
REPORT, July 15, 1976. 
24 The Florida Economic Impact Disclosure Act of 1975, ch. 76-1, 1976 Fla. Laws I 
(repealed by Act of June 28. 1976, ch. 76-276, § 5, 1976 Fla. Laws 750) [hereinafter cited as 
Florida H.B. 874. ch. 76-1, 1976 Fla. Laws I]. 
25 Michigan H.B. 6423. 78th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Michigan.H.B. 
6423 (1976)]. 
26 The legislative history of the two bills- is discussed in Part II B infra. 
27 These bills are hereinafter referred to as the Economic Impact Disclosure Act except 
when there is a reference to a specific bill. 
28 STAFF OF THE MICHIGAN HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF 
MICHIGAN H.B. 6423, (June 21, 1976) [hereinafter cited as APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE 
ANALYSIS]; MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 
6423 (July 9, 1976) [hereinafter cited as MICHIGAN DMB ANALYSIS]. 
29 Florida H.B. ~4. ch. 76-1, § 4(1), 1976 Ela. Laws 2; Michigan H.B. 6423, § 3(1)(1976). 
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state government. 3° Furthermore, the Michigan version requires 
local governmental subdivisions to prepare an EcIS unless the 
action taken is "specifically authorized by a local elected board or 
official. " 31 Under these provisions all state agencies involved in 
significant regulatory activities would be required to file an EcIS in 
appropriate circumstances. 
The definition of the agency activities which trigger the EclS is 
crucial to the ultimate success of the procedure. An overly broad 
definition will produce a flood of statements, preventing agency 
decision-makers and interested parties from focusing on those situ-
ations in which economic analysis might point out deficiencies in 
the contemplated activities. In addition, preparation of the state-
ment could become a mere pro forma exercise generating consid-
erable paperwork with little potential for insightful analysis. A 
narrow definition which excludes important and significant agency 
activity from the economic analysis requirement should also be 
avoided. 
The drafters of Florida H.B. 874 chose to exclude very little from 
their definition of agency action. 
"Agency action" means any action by an agency or subdivi-
son thereof which may have substantial economic impact upon 
any person. Substantial economic impact may occur through a 
related series of agency decisions which individually may not 
have substantial economic impact, but which cumulatively have 
substantial impact. Agency action includes, but is not limited 
to, all rules, ... policy statements, agency bulletins, and in-
ternal agency procedures and other agency decisions which 
may have substantial economic impact.32 
There are few activities of state agencies which are not included 
in such a broad definition. Implementation of the bill would likely 
produce a virtual flood of impact statements. 
The drafters of the Economic Impact Disclosure Act implicitly 
recognized the delay that will be caused by preparation of the EcIS 
and the need for state agencies to act promptly in certain cir-
cumstances, even if some information is not available. As a result, 
certain agency actions are not made subject to the requirements of 
3° Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 3(1), 1976 Fla. Laws 1; Michigan H.B. 6423, § 2(1)(1976). 
31 Michigan H.B. 6423, § 2(b) (1976). 
32 Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 3(2), 1976 Fla. Laws l:The Michigan version, H.B. 6423, 
does not include an enumeration of the various types of agency activity that fall within the 
definition of agency action. Arguably, the definition of agency action will not be as broad as 
in Florida H.B. 874. However, since local government agencies are covered by the Michigan 
bill, the total number of statements filed may still be at least as great in Florida. 
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the Act. 33 Chief among these exclusions are legislative actions,34 
emergency rules or purchases, and "ministerial" activities. 35 
2. Content-The Act lists certain information· which must be 
included in the economic impact statement. 
(a) A description of the action proposed, the purpose for taking 
the action, the legal authority for the action, and the plan for 
implementing the action. 
(b) A determination thaMhe action is the least cost method for 
achieving the stated purpose. 
33 Florida exempted the following agency actions from the coverage of the Act: 
(I) The collection and payment of social security funds, retirement funds, or 
employee benefit funds. 
(2) Participation in any federal program, if under federal law the participation 
would be prevented by compliance with this act. 
(3) All emergency rules, or emergency purchases, ... ; provided however, within 
a reasonable period of time after the action, an appropriate economic impact 
statement shall be prepared. 
(4) All legislative actions .... 
(5) All purchases by any state agency which have a fair market or monetary value 
which is less than $50,000. 
(6) Ministerial action by an agency which complies with applicable statutes and 
rules. 
(7) Action by a state agency which is required by law to be maintained as· 
confidential. 
(8) The preparation and sale of all bonds ... . 
(9) Expenditures of money from trust funds ... . 
(10) Judicial actions by the judicial branch of government, and by the Industrial 
Relations Commission. 
(11) Judicial or quasi-judicial functions of [several other state agencies]. 
(12) Action taken by the State Board of Administration. 
(13) The prosecution of civil, criminal or administrative actions before any court 
or before an administrative hearing officer. 
(14) Actions involving persons in the custody of the state .... 
Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 7, 1976 Fla. Laws 2-3. 
34 Even though legislative actions are excluded from the coverage of the Act, a member of 
the Florida legislature may request that an agency prepare an economic impact statement on 
any proposed legislation which has a direct relationship to the agency. Florida H.B. 874, ch. 
76- I, § 6, 1976 Fla. Laws 2. The exclusion of legislative activity is somewhat puzzling given 
the greater potential of legislation to affect significantly economic activity. See note 51 infra. 
Certain states have provided a limited form of economic analysis for proposed legislation, 
known as a fiscal note. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 13.10 (I 973). Fiscal notes are limited to a 
prediction of the effect of the proposed legislation on the expenditures or revenues of state 
or local governments. Thus, fiscal notes are much less comprehensive than economic impact 
statements. 
35 The exclusion of ministerial activities from the requirements of the Act could be a 
potent source of confusion. Distinguishing between ministerial and discretionary administra-
tive acts is also crucial in determining whether mandamus will lie to compel an official to 
perform a duty imposed by law. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
CASES AND COMMENTS 151-60 (6th ed. 1974). This distinction has caused the courts a great 
deal of trouble in the mandamus setting and its importation into the scope of economic 
impact statements is unwise. Professor Jaffe has concluded: 
The notion that each administrative act can be classified a priori either as 
"ministerial" or "discretionary" is unsound and unworkable. If the mandamus 
cases in any one state are studied as a body, it will be found impossible to reconcile 
the decisions simply by assigning each to one or the other class. The classification 
is illusory; it is apt to label the result rather than explain it. 
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF_ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 181 (1965). 
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(c) A comparison of the cost benefit relation of the action to 
nonaction. 
(d) A determination that the action represents the most efficient 
use of public and private resources. 
(e) A determination of the effect of action on competition. 
(t) A conclusion as to the economic impact of the proposed 
agency action on preserving an open market for employment. 
(g) A conclusion as to the economic impact upon all persons 
substantially affected by the action, including an analysis con-
taining a description as to which persons will bear the costs of 
the action and which persons will benefit directly and indirectly 
from the action. 36 
The agency will exercise considerable discretion in predicting 
these various impacts. The admonition to use professionally ac-
cepted methodology37 does not significantly restrict this discretion 
as there are no standards yet developed against which to compare 
the techniques used by the agency. To be meaningful the EcIS 
should include an explanation of the technique used to measure 
and balance impacts in addition to a prediction of those impacts. 38 
The requirement that the agency determine that the action is the 
least cost method of achieving the stated purpose could be a 
significant limitation upon agency discretion. Narrowly construed, 
it would mandate that economic efficiency, defined _in terms of 
government expenditures, is the overriding consideration in agency 
decision-making.39 This approach differs considerably from the 
existing_procedure in which the agency is allowed to consider other 
noneconomic factors in arriving at its decision. 40 
36 Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 4, 1976 Fla. Laws i; Michigan H.B. 6423, § 3 (1976). 
37 See text accompanying note 29 supra. 
38 See Part III infra. 
39 The title of "Economic Impact Disclosure Act" is somewhat misleading. The Act goes 
beyond disclosure of predicted economic impacts to require that the agency choose the most 
efficient alternative to achieve the stated purpose. Governor Askew, in his letter vetoing 
Florida H.B. 874, stated: 
[Tihe language of the bill that an economic impact statement must contain a 
determination that the agency action is the least-cost method of achieving a stated 
purpose may be interpreted as limiting the options open to the agency. A narrow 
view of the "costs" of a course of action would preclude consideration of non-
monetary impacts and not serve the public interest. 
Letter from Governor Reubin Askew to Secretary of State Bruce A. Smathers (June 27, 
1975) (vetoing H.B 874) [hereinafter cited as VETO MESSAGE] (on file with the UNIVERSITY 
OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM]. 
There is a potential conflict between a narrowly construed "least cost" requirement and 
the requirement that the action be the most efficient use of resources. Quite conceivably, an 
increased expenditure could result in a more efficient use of resources, as measured by a 
cost-benefit ratio or some other formula. In some situations the two requirements may be 
incompatible. 
•
0 A more traditional concern has been that the agency weighs economic factors too 
heavily at the expense of other values which are not as easily quantified. See remarks of 
Senator Jackson, note 79 infra; Stewart, supra note 3, at 1704. 
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3. Public and Judicial Review-In addition, the Act provides a 
mechanism for public participation in the activities of state agen-
cies. The Michigan version, H.B. 6423, requires that economic 
impact statements be filed in the office of the county clerk, and that 
the statements be made available to the public. 41 Judicial review 
over agency implementation of the Act may be obtained by any 
"aggrieved person." 42 Courts are given a significant oversight 
function over agency preparation of the statements. 
The court ... may review ... the timeliness of the filing of 
the economic impact statement and the adequacy of the state-
ment to determine whether or not the statement was prepared in 
accordance with [the requirements of the Act]. 
The acting agency shall not be accorded a presumption of 
expertise and a person challenging the action shall have the 
burden of proving the case only by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 43 
The likelihood that litigation will be a principal method of ensuring 
agency compliance has been enhanced by provisions giving the 
court discretion to award costs and attorneys' fees to the prevailing 
party. 44 Under the Florida version, the EcIS was to be part of the 
record for judicial review under the Florida Administrative Proce-
dure Act.45 
41 Michigan H.B. 6423, § 3(3) (1976). 
42 Id. § 7(1). The question of identifying an "aggrieved person", that is, one who will have 
standing to seek judicial review of the agency preparation of the Eels· is similar to that 
arising under state"and federal Administrative Procedure Acts. The Michigan law provides, 
"When a person ... is aggrieved by a final decision or order ... the decision or order is 
subject to direct review, by the courts as provided by law." MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 24.301 
(1970). The federal Administrative Procedure Act states: "A person ... adversely affected 
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). The businesses directly regulated by state agencies 
will be able to show economic "irijury in fact" and should have no problem with standing. 
More difficult problems may arise with respect to consumers and consumer groups. In 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the 
Court laid down two criteria a party must satisfy in order to obtain judicial review of an 
agency action under the A.P.A. The plaintiff must allege injury in fact and the interest 
asserted must arguably be within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the relevant 
statute. Id. at 152-53. Consumers or consumer groups should be able to assert that their 
interest in the effective administration of state regulatory agencies is within the zone of 
interests protected by the Economic Impact Disclosure Act. See Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the court stated: 
"Consumers of regulated products and services have standing to protect the public interest 
in the proper administration of a regulatory system enacted for their benefit." Consumers 
also should be able to establish an injury in fact given the willingness of the courts to follow 
an "attenuated line of causation" flowing from the agency action to the consumer. See 
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure, 412 U.S. 669, 688 
(1973). 
43 Michigan H.B. 6423, § 7 (1976). 
44 Id. § 7(4). 
45 FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50 - .73 (1973). Florida H.B. 874 originally had a section dealing 
specifically with judicial review, but it was deleted by floor amendments. The final version 
merely requires the EclS to accompany proposed rules filed under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 5, 1976 Fla. Laws 2. 
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Florida H.B. 874 was passed by the legislature in 1975, but was 
vetoed by Governor Askew. While stating that he supported the 
basic concept behind the bill, 46 the Governor voiced objection to 
numerous aspects of the bill and revealed his fear that "a potential 
exists for the requirement to be used as a tool to stymie the proper 
operation of government. " 47 The legislature overrode his veto on 
April 8, 1976, and as a result, the Florida Economic Impact Disclo-
sure Act of 1975 was scheduled to take effect on July 1, 1976.48 
The discussion spurred by the veto and override led to the repeal 
of the Economic Impact Disclosure Act before it became effec-
tive. 49 It was feared that the scope of agency activity covered by 
the Act was too broad and that the day-to-day activities of the 
government would be severely curtailed.50 The same bill also 
amended the Florida Administrative Procedure Act to require an 
economic impact statement for.administrative rules,51 but internal 
agency procedures, agency bulletins and other agency activities 
are no longer subject to the requirement. The EcIS is part of the 
record which is reviewed by the Administrative Procedure Com-
mittee of the legislature before the rule is promulgated.52 
Michigan's version of the Economic Impact Disclosure Act was 
never passed by its legislature. The Michigan House of Represen-
tatives passed H.B. 6423, unanimously and without amendment, 
within three weeks of its introduction. 53 The Michigan Senate State 
Affairs· Committee held public hearings,54 studied the issues in-
volved more carefully, and never reported the bill out of commit-
tee. 
46 Governor Askew stated: "I completely support the basic concept behind the bill. The 
executive branch of government, as- well as the legislature, should be cognizant of the 
economic impact of its actions and should be able to justify those actions in view of the 
impact." VETO MESSAGE, supra note 39. 
41 Id. 
48 Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 9, 1976 Fla. Laws 3. 
49 Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 76-276, § 5, 1976 Fla. Laws 750 (Florida S.B. 949 (1976)). 
50 VETO MESSAGE, supra note 39. See Letter from Governor Askew to Robert L. Bartley, 
Editor of the Wall Street Journal (May JO, 1976) (responding to an editorial of May 5, 1976, 
critical of the Governor's veto). 
51 FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1973) was amended to require that, prior to the adoption, 
amendment, or repeal of any rule, the agency must prepare an economic impact statement 
and include a summary of the estimated economic impact in its notice of intended action. In 
addition, the legislature is required to consider the economic impact that proposed legisla-
tion will have upon the public and affected agencies. However, no law can be declared 
invalid for failure of the legislature to comply with the requirement. Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 
76-276, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 752. 
52 FLA. STAT. § 120.54(10)(a) (1973), as amended by Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 76-276, §§ 
1-2, 1976 Fla. Laws 751-752. 
53 Michigan House Journal, 78th Legis., Reg. Sess., 2177, June 22, 1976. 
54 See Michigan Senate Journal, 78th Legis., Reg. Sess., 1826, September 13, 1976. The 
author is indebted to the Michigan Senate State Affairs Committee staff which provided 
background material and analyses of Michigan H.B. 6423. 
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C. Purposes 
The Economic Impact Disclosure Act seeks to remedy the fail-
ure of state agencies to consider adequately the economic impact 
which contemplated actions have on individuals and the business 
community. 55 From a broader perspective, however, the Act may 
be viewed as another legislative attempt to limit the discretionary 
power of state agencies through procedures altering and constrict-
ing the decision-making process. The Act is thus designed to en-
sure the responsiveness of agency activity to the public interest 
and to the legislative intent embodied in the applicable statute.56 
The framers of the Act attempted to achieve this purpose by full 
investigation and disclosure of the economic consequences of 
agency actions. In addition, the agency's discretion is curbed by 
requiring that the agency action be the one most justified, deter-
mined by reference to economic criteria. The availability of 
economic information is designed to prevent unintended and un-
foreseen economic costs to consumers and the business commun-
ity. Public participation and judicial review are designed to im-
prove agency decison-making by preventing actions based upon 
obviously biased agency evaluations and by allowing close scrutiny 
of the justifications offered for agency actions.57 
In theory, the Economic Impact Disclosure Act has the potential 
to generate significant cost savings for the state. The requirements 
that a cost-benefit analysis be made and that the agency determine, 
and presumably select, the least cost alternative c;ertainly evidence 
a legislative intent to promote efficient use of government re-
sources through statement preparation as well as to promote 
agency responsiveness. In the long run, the EcIS could be a signifi-
cant tool in coordinating the activities and planning among state 
agencies and with the legislature. 58 
55 The findings and intent section of Florida H.B. 874 (1976) is illustrative. 
The Legislature finds that a state agency should not regulate or restrict the 
freedom of any person to conduct his affairs, use his property or deal with others 
on mutually agreeable terms unless it finds, after full consideration of the effect of 
agency action, that the action would benefit the public interest and encourage the 
benefits of a free enterprise system for the citizens of Florida .... The Legislature 
further recognizes that agency action taken without evaluation of its economic 
impact may have unintended effects which may include barriers to competition, 
reduced economic efficiency, unjustified transfers of value from one person to 
another, reduced consumer choice, increased producer and consumer costs and 
restrictions on employment. Accordingly it is the continuing responsibility of 
agencies to analyze the economic impact of agency actions and reevaluate the 
economic impact of agency actions to determine that the actions promote ··the 
public interest. 
Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § I, 1976 Fla. Laws I. 
56 See APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, supra note 28. 
57 See Stewart, supra note 3, at 1674-76. 
58 MICHIGAN DMB ANALYSIS, supra note 51. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SER-
VICES, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6423 (July 16, 1976) [hereinafter cited as DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
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Underlying these justifications is a perception of the decision-
making process as a basically rational system susceptible to im-
provement by requiring the decision-maker to gather and evaluate 
more information. This approach views the agency decision-
makers as value-free59 administrators choosing the proper alterna-
tive from among the various possible means of solving a problem or 
achieving some clearly defined goal. An EcIS would further 
rationalize the process by providing more information for the 
decision-maker and by affording public disclosure to aid interested 
parties in challenging agency action. These two assumptions, that a 
"correct" decision or alternative exists, and that a rational value-
free process will help the agency reach that decision, are examined 
in Part III, but it should be noted that the purposes and procedures 
of the bill implicitly rest on a model of decision-making that is 
widely disputed.60 
D. Criticisms 
Despite its purpose of increasing the responsiveness of state 
agencies, the Economic Impact Disclosure Act would further slow 
the already cumbersome processes of govemment.61 An initial 
delay for statement preparation would be necessary if the 
economic impact .statements are to provide relevant information. 
This delay may be appropriate for those decisions which have 
significant long-run social and economic consequences which are 
not clearly understood. But the scope of the Economic Impact 
Disclosure Act ex tends far beyond these decisions into the daily 
activities of state agencies. 62 Agency responsiveness is not in-
creased by a procedure, applicable to all state agencies, which 
indiscriminately mandates a formal procedure for such a wide 
range of. agency activities. 63 
SERVICES ANALYSIS]; MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6423 
(Aug. 5, 1976) [hereinafter cited as DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE ANALYSIS]. 
"" Agency decision-makers should seek to further the values of the legislature rather than 
their personal value preferences or those of some other group which is not politically 
responsive. As some observers have stated: "Agencies would be said to fail when they 
reach substantive policy decisons (including decisions not to act) that do not coincide with 
what the politically accountable branches of government would have done if they had 
possessed the time, the information, and the will to make such decisions." Cutler & 
Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1399 (1975). 
60 See Part IV infra. 
61 See note 105 and accompanying text infra. 
62 This criticism is particularly applicable to Florida H.B. 874. See VETO MESSAGE, supra 
note 39; Part II A.supra. 
63 As the Ash Council Report stated," Accountability and fairness, however, include not 
only arriving at a correct disposition, but its timely implementation, Indeed, where the effort 
is to respond to dynamic economic and social problems, the timing of the response often is 
of critical significance." THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE REORGAN 1-
ZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT AGEN-
CIES 53 (1971). 
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For an uncertain time after the effective date of the Act, the 
probability of delay will be particularly great since agencies cur~ 
rently lack the expertise necessary to prepare an adequate 
economic impact statement. 64 The expansive judicial review 
granted by the Act will enable parties aggrieved by agency action 
io obtain injunctive or other relief at least until the agencies de-
ve_lop the expertise neces~ary to withstand close judicial 
sc:rutiny .65 The delay caused by statement preparation will be 
further exacerbated by judicial review of the statement. 
It is not clear, however, that expansive powers of judicial review 
would effectively ensure agency compliance with the goals of the 
Act. The courts are not equipped to decide whether the agency is 
using the most accurate or reliable economic techniques in its 
measurements of the yarious factors. 66 Thus, an examination of an 
agency's economic predictions is not an effective method of check-
ing unwanted agency activity, especially when the court would 
retain its traditional powers to halt agency activity that violates 
constitutional, statutory, or procedural dictates.67 Because of the 
potential for delay, the expansion of judicial review to include an 
examination of the adequacy of the economic impact statement is 
not warranted. 
State agencies will incur_ significant additional costs if they are 
required to produce detailed economic analyses. Additional staff 
64 APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, supra note 28; MICHIGAN DMB ANALYSIS, 
supra note 28; DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES ANALYSIS, supra note 58. 
65 The Michigan Department of Civil Service was particularly sensitive to the problem of 
litigaVon disrupting agency activities. 
Development of adequate procedures and practices by which agencies become 
capable of fulfilling the requirements of this bill may take two to five years, 
according to experts in the field of management. It hardly seems advisable to 
expose government agencies to potential court suits on a process which may be in 
developmental stages for the next two to five years. 
MICHIGAN CIVIL SERVICE ANALYSIS, supra note 59. 
66 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972), in which the Court 
stated, "[C]ourts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems." See also 
Stewart, supra note 3, ·at 1710-1 I. 
67 The Michigan Administrative Procedure Act provides an example of the scope of 
judicial review. 
(I) Except when a statute or the constitution provides for a different scope of 
review, the court shall hold unlawful and set aside a decision or order of an agency 
if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the decision or 
order is any of the following: . 
(a) In violation of the constitution or a statute. 
· (b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency. 
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure resulting in material prejudice to an agency. 
(d) Not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole 
record. 
(e) Arbitrary, .capricious or clearly an abuse or unwarranted exercise of discre-
tion. 
(f) Affected by other substantial and material errors of law. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 24.306 (197.0). 
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would be required to prepare the EcIS's68 and additional legal 
expenses could be expected as a result of the increased litigation. 
The delays and increased costs would be justified if increased 
efficiency and more responsive agency decisions resulted. The 
expectation of efficiency and responsiveness must be evaluated in 
terms of the utility of this type of economic analysis in limiting the 
discretionary powers of state agencies and its role in the agency 
decision-making process. 
III. THE USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The Economic Impact Disclosure Act is an attempt to structure 
administrative decisions through economic techniques.69 Through 
resort to supposedly unbiased economic data, administrative agen-
cies are to arrive at the preferable regulatory decision, thereby 
avoiding claims that the agency has abused its discretion. One 
commentator has observed that use of economic techniques is to 
"hold out a generalized method of reaching unique or non-
discretionary policy solutions which merit acceptance because 
they are the result of technical or value free procedures of social 
choice . " 70 
Economic analysis gives "the appearance of value-free rationality 
at work." 71 By isolating the crucial economic variables and apply-
ing scientific methodology to measure the effect of alternate ac-
tions, the decision-maker is presented with a quantified evaluation 
of the relative desirability of each choice. The requirement that the 
decision-maker pick the alternative which the economic analysis 
shows to be the most justified is designed to eliminate discretion 
from the decision. Such an approach ignores the analyst's discre-
tion in selecting and measuring the probable impacts of alternatives 
and also the importance of noneconomic, nonquantifiable values 
to the decision-maker and to the larger society. 
The analyst who prepares an EcIS operates with tremendous 
68 The Michigan Department of Public Health estimated that Department expenditures for 
statement preparation would be $234,967 yearly. It estimated that seven program analysts 
and seven support personnel would be required. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6423 (June 21, 1976). 
69 See Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-Making: The Limitations of Legal 
Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated by the Regulation of 
Vacation Home Development, 1976 WISC. L. REV. 385, 386, where the author states that 
"the use of economic techniques to structure legal decisions has been the most important 
development in recent jurisprudential theory .... It is against the inadequacy of traditional 
doctrine to satisfactorily resolve innovative problems that the emergence of legal economics 
must be understood." 
70 Id. at 387. 
71 Kramer, Policy Analysis as Ideology, 35 Pue. Ao. REY. 509, 509 (1975). 
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leeway. Although the variables for consideration are outlined and 
the Act requires "professionally accepted methodology, " 72 the 
analyst will exercise discretionary judgment in defining the vari-
ables, in predicting the long-term effects of a policy choice, and in 
the selection of alternatives to be considered. In addition, the 
results of a "scientific" economic analysis will reflect the ideology 
of the analyst. 73 His ideological perspective will undoubtedly lead 
the analyst to inquire into certain effects, to ignore others, and to 
alter the weights accorded to various factors. 74 In particular, three 
categories of interests or values are likely to be accorded insuffi-
cient weight by policy analysts: those too widely diffused to be 
strongly advocated by any interested party; those associated with 
future generations; and those not associated with human factors. 75 
The conclusion drawn from the economic analysis will be shaped 
by the perspective of the analyst. This, even supposedly value-
free economic analysis involves significant administrative discre-
tion in its preparation. 
Other shortcomings of economic analysis also prevent non-
discretionary, objective admin.istrative decisions. To rank alterna-
tives involves an assumption about society's preferences for goods 
and services. 76 Otherwise, the relative desirability of each alterna-
tive cannot be ascertained. The problem arises in determining 
which set of preferences should be used. To use a set of existing 
preferences ignores both the tremendous impact of government 
policies on future preferences77 and the desirability of altering 
present preferences to achieve long-term goals. To rank alterna-
tives according to the analyst's conception of which preferences 
should be encouraged and which should be ignored destroys any 
semblance of objectivity, but the heart of government policy-
making is to make precisely such choices. 
Economic analysis cannot provide a "correct" solution to the 
regulatory problems which confront an administrative agency. Be-
cause the ideologies of policy analysts differ, respectable economic 
justifications can be advanced for a number of different alterna-
tives. Even without the influence of ideology, the information 
-72 See text accompanying note 29 supra. 
73 In this context, "ideology" refers to a belief or value system consisting of attitudes 
toward the various societal institutions and processes. It provides a picture of the world by 
organizing its complexity into a reasonably simple and understandable framework. See L. 
SARGENT, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES I (1972). 
74 Kramer, supra note 71, at 509. 
75 Tribe. Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology, 2 PHIL. & Pue. AFF. 66, 104 (1972). 
76 This criticism of economic analysis is more fully developed in Stewart, supra note 3, at 
1704-06. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text infra. 
77 Federal housing and transportation policies since World War II have had a tremendous 
impact upon present preferences and lifestyles. See id., at 1706 n.179. 
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necessary to resolve questions concerning optimal economic effi-
ciency may be impossible or prohibitively expensive to obtain. 78 
The information presented to the decison-maker by economic 
analysis does not reveal a clearly superior choice. Indeed, 
economic efficiency is not and should not be the sole criterion. 
Nonquantifiable values play an equally important role and may 
override economic ones. Where these values are important consid-
erations they should be disclosed and made subject to public in-
spection. Economic analysis is no substitute for the normative and. 
political considerations which motivate decison-makers. Placing 
economic impact in a preeminent position obscures the identity 
and importance of these nonquantifiable criteria. If the decision-
maker is required to offer an economic impact statement to justify 
his decision, there is sufficient leeway in statement preparation to 
enable him to do so. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING 
The Economic Impact Disclosure Act attempts to place detailed 
information at the disposal of the decison-maker so that he will be 
able to arrive at the optimal solution to a perceived problem. Like 
NEPA,79 the Act is an attempt to render the decision-making 
78 For an example of the complexities and problems associated with applying sophisti-
cated economic techniques to determine the optimal number of vacation homes, see Heller, 
supra note ff), at 395-438. 
79 NEPA attempts to rationalize the agency decision-making process by requiring a 
comprehensive plan of environmental management. Senator Henry M. Jackson, the sponsor 
of NEPA, explicitly rejected the incremental model of decision-making, discussed in Part IV 
B infra, as an acceptable guide for agency decision-making. 
Over the years, in small but steady and growing increments, we in America have 
been making very important decisions concerning the management of our environ-
ment. Unfortunately, these haven't always been very wise decisions. Throughout 
much of our history, the goal of managing the environment for the benefit of all 
citizens has often been overshadowed and obscured by the pursuit of narrower and 
more immediate economic goals. 
It is only in the past few years that the dangers of this form of muddling through 
events and establishing policy by inaction and default have been very widely 
perceived .... 
This report proposes that the American people, the Congress, and the adminis-
tration break the shackles of incremental policy-making in the management of 
natural resources. 
115 CONG. REC. 29068-69 (1969). See D'Amato & Baxter, The Impact of Impact Statements 
Upon Agency Responsibility: A Prescriptive Analysis, 59 IowA L. REv. 195, 198 n.6 (1973); 
Fairfax, A Disaster in the Environmental Movement: An Essay On the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (unpublished manuscript); Friesma & Culhane, Social Impacts, 
Politics, and the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16 NAT. REs. J. 339, 340 (1976); 
Liroff, Administrative, Judicial and Natural Systems: Agency Response to the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 3 LOY. CHI. L.J. 19, 25-33 (1972); Comment, The 
National Environmental Policy Act Applied to Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 799, 808 n.42 (1973). 
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process more responsive to considerations which the legislature 
believes have been given insufficient weight. Attention must be 
given to the decison-making in order to insure that the probable 
effect of EcIS's on administrative decision-making will be to pro-
vide information that will impact on the process in a meaningful 
manner. 
A. The Rational Model 
The traditional view of the decision-making process is a rational 
system in which the relevant actor becomes aware of a problem, 
weighs alternative solutions, and then chooses a solution based 
upon his estimate of their respective merits.80 The successful oper-
ation of the rational model imposes certain requirements. The 
decision-maker must have detailed information about alternative 
courses of action and their consequences. There must be a gener-
r.ally accepted set of values to serve as a basis for the selection of 
goals and to judge the desirability of various alternatives. The 
decision-maker must calculate the desirability of each alternative 
based upon its utility in furthering those values. Finally, the most 
desirable policy alternative must be selected. 8 1. Thus, under the 
rational model the decision-maker is clearly able to separate the 
means and ends, facts and values, and can comprehensively survey 
the alternatives to arrive eventually at the optimal solution to the 
problem. 
An economic impact statement is designed to operate within the 
context of this rational model. The EclS provides the decision-
maker with detailed information on the predicted effect of an 
action. The list of factors to be considered82 is an attempt to define 
the values which the government agency should promote. The 
listing of alternatives should define the scope of the decision-
maker's inquiry. In theory, the EclS should quantify the merit of 
each alternative, enabling the decision-maker to choose the alter-
native best suited to deal with the problem in light of the defined 
values. 
The rational model is not a sufficiently realistic description of 
decision-making in administrative agencies.83 The model ignores 
80 The rational model of the decision-~aking process seems to be drawn from the con-
cepts of economic man, the scientific method, and the ideal model of bureaucracy postulated 
by Max Weber. See Pfiffner, Administrative Rationality, 20 Pue. Ao. REv. 125 (1960). 
81 This description of a rational process of administrative decision-making is drawn from 
Etzioni. Mixed Scanning: A "Third" Approach to Decision-Making, 27 Pue. Ao. REv. 385, 
385 (1967). 
82 See text accompanying note 36 supra. 
83 Dror, Muddling Through-"Science" or Inertia?, 24 Pue. Ao. REV. 153, 153 (1964). 
584 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:566 
both the intellectual limitations of the decision-maker and the polit-
ical context within which the agency functions. Decison-makers do 
not attempt a comprehensive survey of all the possible alterna-
tives. The cost of obtaining all of the relevant information and the 
requisite analysis is too great. Moreover, the decision-maker has 
only a limited amount of time to assimilate and to evaluate informa-
tion before coming to a decision. 
The assumption that an agency as a decision-maker has a clearly 
defined set of values has also been disputed.84 Within any organi-
zation there will be no shared set of clearly defined values or 
agreement as to the means to effect any given value.85 The values 
upon which there is widespread agreement are likely to be too 
vague to serve as a guide for decision-making.86 Any attempt to 
establish a guideline set of values ignores the fluidity of values and 
their constant revision as societal value preferences change. 
Since the decision-maker cannot assemble and evaluate detailed 
information on alternatives and there is no common set of values to 
provide a basis for ranking those alternatives, the rational model 
cannot precisely describe the decision-making process of a large 
organization such as a government agency. One commentator on 
public administration has concluded, "A decision-maker, attempt-
ing to adhere to the tenets of a rationalistic model, will become 
frustrated, exhaust his resources without coming to a decision, and 
remain without an effective decision-making model to guide him. 
Rationalistic models are thus rejected as being at once unrealistic 
and undesirable. " 87 
B. The Incremental Model 
The theoretical shortcomings of the rational model are well 
known and various alternate theories have been advanced to re-
concile the limitations of the decision-maker with the desire for a 
basically rational decision-making process.88 An alternate ap-
proach, known as the incremental model of decision-making, has 
been ~dvanced and refined by Professor Charles Lindblom. 89 Re-
84 C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 141 (1965) ("There seems to be no 
feasible way [of] ascertaining preferences on all the policy decisions that must be taken in 
government, or even on any substantial minority of them."). 
85 Id. at 139-41. 
86 C. LINDLBOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 17 (1968). 
87 Etzioni, supra note 81, at 386. 
88 See, e.g .. Y. DROR, PUBLIC POLICY REEXAMINED ·129-96 (1968); w. GORE, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE DECISION-MAKING: A HEURISTIC MODEL ()964); H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE 
BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1965); Pfiffner, supra note 80. 
89 The concept of incremental decision-making was introduced in Lindblom, The Science 
of"Muddling Through", 19 Pue. Ao. REV. 79 (1959). The model was further developed and 
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jecting the unrealistic assumptions of the rational model, he posits 
a process which is far from rational, but which more accurately 
describes the actual decision-making process.90 
Under the incrementalist approach, decision-makers do not at-
tempt to reach the optimal response to a problem; rather, they 
settle for those solutions which provide a relatively satisfactory 
realization of their values. 91 The model posits the following pro-
cess:92 · 
(I) The decision-maker does not attempt a comprehensive sur-
vey and evaluation of alternatives, but rather limits his attention 
to policies which differ incrementally from existing policies. 
(2) Out of a concern for political feasibility, the decision-maker 
considers only a restricted number of those incremental alterna-
tives. 
(3) For each alternative only a few of the important consequen-
ces are considered; other important consequences are disre-
garded. 
(4) The problem facing the decision-maker is continually rede-
fined as the ends and means are adjusted to make the problems 
more manageable. 
(5) Thus, no "correct" solution is found because a never-ending 
series of attacks is made on a constantly redefined problem. 
(6) The decision-making process is remedial, designed to al-
leviate existing social problems rather than to achieve future 
goals. · 
The incremental model describes a process of decision-making 
far less demanding and far more shortsighted than the rational 
model. Since only incremental policy changes are considered, the 
decision-maker requires far less information to make his decision. 
Furthermore, since the objective of the decision-maker is neither 
to solve a problem nor to find the "correct" solution, the 
decision-maker can ignore some ~onsequences and refrain from 
defining values since there will always be an opportunity for later 
evaluation. The policy decision can be altered as unforeseen conse-
quences become apparent, the value preferences of society or the 
decision-maker change, or political shifts make an attractive alter-
native feasible. 93 
refined in D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION (1963). and C. 
LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965). 
0° Frederickson. Public Administration in the 1970s: Developments and Directions, 36 
PuB. AD. REv. 564, 569 (1976). While not fully accepting the incremental model, Fre-
derickson states, "Quite clearly, the incremental ... view is the most empirically accurate 
of the approaches to rationality." Id. at 569. 
91 H. SIMON, supra note 88, at XXV. 
92 The following summary is that of the author of this note. It is drawn from C. 
LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 144-48 (1965). 
93 D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 124 (f963). 
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The incremental model has also been criticized from both a 
normative and descriptive standpoint.94 Viewed in the context of a 
pluralistic society, the model underrepresents the poor and politi-
cally unorganized whose value preferences are not fully rep-
resented by decision-makers.95 The model also ignores the process 
of achieving basic societal innovations since it focuses on short-
term changes with only limited variations from existing policies. 96 
An economic impact statement has a much less important role 
when viewed from the perspective of the incremental model of 
decision-making. Rather than being limited to incremental policy 
alternatives, the EclS is designed to force detailed consideration of 
all possible alternatives. An EcIS is designed to illustrate the single 
best solution to the problem, but the model suggests that 
decision-makers do not solve problems but merely adopt short-
term, remedial steps that will be satisfactory to the agency and 
· other interested actors. In addition, an economic impact statement 
does not allow room for different alternatives to become accepta-
ble as values change and political forces shift. 
C. The Role of an Economic Impact Statement 
in the Decision-Making Process 
Apart from th_e definitional problems in Florida H.B. 874 and 
Michigan H.B. 6423, and the potential for agency manipulation in 
statement preparation, reliance on the EcIS to improve the agency 
decision-making process appears misguided. Administrative agen-
cies are not rational actors devising policies designed to achieve 
social goals. Their decisions must be acceptable within the agen-
cy's political environment.97 They will be responsive to those 
groups who can influence their organizational well-being. A gov-
ernment agency seeks to maintain positive relationships with those 
groups-the executive, legislators, other administrators, and inter-
est groups-that form its constituency.98 The agency will develop 
94 See Dror, supra note 83; Etzioni. supra note 81; Heyde brand. Administration of Social 
Change, 24 Pue. Ao. REV. 163 (1964); Jones, The Model as a Decision Maker's Dilemma, 
24 Pue. Ao. REv. 158 (1964). 
95 Etzioni, supra note 81, at 387. 
96 Dror, supra note 83, at 155 states that, "[a]lthough Lindblom's thesis includes a 
number of reservations, these are insufficient to alter its mam impact as an 1cteolog1ca1 
reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces prevalent in all human organiza-
tions, administrative and policy making." 
For an attempt to synthesize the rational and incremental models of decision-making, see 
Etzioni, supra note 81, at 388-92. 
97 Holden, "Imperialism" in Bureaucracy, 60 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 943 (1966). 
98 Holden defines constituency to include "any group, body or interest to which the 
administrative politician looks for aid or guidance, or which seeks to establish itself as so 
important (in his judgment) that he '. had better' take _account of its preferences." Id. at 944. 
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policies that are acceptable to those groups regardless of economic 
predictions that indicate an alternate policy may be more desirable. 
This analysis does not suggest that economic analysis is not 
valuable or that agency decision-makers should not try to reach 
rational solutions to the problems they face. But the type of 
economic analysis required by the Economic Impact Disclosure 
Act is not an effective method offurthering these goals. The cost of 
statement preparation will be considerable and the potential for 
delay is significant. The benefit to the decision-making process is 
outweighed by these costs. Agency decisions will continue to be 
responsive to the demands of the agency's consitituency .99 Those 
decisions will be framed by the values advanced by members of the 
constituency and the agency and the need to find a solution accept-
able to both. 10° Consequently, the EcIS will probably function as a 
tool to justify the agency's decision rather than as an integral part 
of the planning process. 101 
The concepts of economic analysis suggest that procedural 
changes in the agency decision-making process cannot be justified 
if the costs of the change outweigh the resulting benefits. The EcIS 
required by the Economic Impact Disclosure Act cannot meet this 
99 The environmental impact statement requirement of NEPA can be justified as provid-
ing a basis for exerting political pressures on federal agencies. 
[l]f one evaluates EIS's in terms of the quality or even potential quality of the 
science which is brought to bear on environmental policy issues, the evaluation is 
discouraging. However, if one takes a more political perspective, NEPA seems to 
have created a new complex political process which can be and has been used very 
effectively to improve the social and environmental sensitivity of government 
decision-makers. 
Friesma & Culhane, Social Impact, Politics, and the Environmental Impact Statement 
Process, 16 NAT. RES. J. 339, 340 (1976). 
NEPA created an avenue for environmental groups, previously unrepresented in inany 
agencies, to exert effective political pressure on decision-makers. The same justification is 
not available for the Economic Impact Disclosure Act. The economic effects of agency 
action, unlike the environmental ones, are examined prior to the decision. See note 28 and 
accompanying text supra. In addition, it is not clear that the Act would prqvide a method for 
previously ignored parties to exert effective political pressure on the agency. The business 
community has been the most forceful advocate of the Economic Impact Disclosure Act, yet 
these businesses are already able to communicate their opinions on proposed actions to the . 
agencies. There is no indiciation that the Act would change the relative distribution of 
political power as NEPA has done. Professor Andrews has commented that: 
The enactment of NEPA was an attempt to bring about administrative change by 
changes in procedures, and it may yet prove to have achieved some enduring 
success. However, such success should probably be attributed to the maintenance 
of political forces that have been engendered by the Act and the prevalent r.:limate 
of environmental and related values. not to the direct effect of NEPA procedures 
on agency activities. 
Andrews. supra note 19, at 322. Thus any attempt to force the agency to be more responsive 
to the economic impact of its activities through procedures altering the decision-making 
process will not be effective unless there is a political climate to reinforce the procedural 
change. 
100 Holden. supra note 97. at 944. 
101 This is basically the same criticism that has been leveled at environmental impact 
statements. See s9urces listed in notes 19-20 supra. 
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test. It will not effectively limit the discretionary powers of state 
agencies because economic analysis of this type reflects the ideol-
ogy of the policy analyst. It will not increase the responsiveness of 
state agencies to the public interest and legislative intent, but will 
instead be manipulated to justify decisions which are based on 
undisclosed factors. 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
Economic analysis can play a useful role in the decision-making 
context and should be encouraged if its limitations are appreciated. 
Proposed legislation and administrative rules should be examined 
prior to implementation to the extent reasonably possible. There is, 
however, no need for a formal mechanism of the type required by 
the Economic Impact Disclosure Act. The EcIS has limited poten-
tial for alleviating problems caused by the vast discretionary pow-
ers of administrative agencies. 
However, more modest goals could be furthered by a statement 
from the agency outlining the expected effects of a proposed rule. 
Such a statement could serve as a method of disclosure establish-
ing that the agency considered economic factors in reaching its 
decision. In -addition, it would give the legislature and public an 
opportunity to ascertain agency bias in the measurement and 
weighing of values. These disclosures can be made by a much less 
elaborate and less costly procedure than the one required by the 
Economic Impact Disclosure Act. 
An example of a procedure providing for disclosure of antici-
pated economic impact is found in the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. 102 
When promulgating a rule defining unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices, the FTC must issue a statement of basis and purpose. 103 
The Commission's statement of basis and purpose to accom-
pany a rule promulgated ... shall include (A) a statement as to 
the prevalence of the acts or practices treated by the rule; (B) a 
statement as to the manner and context in which such acts or 
practices are unfair or deceptive; and (C) a statement as to the 
economic effect of the rule, taking into account the effect on 
small business and consumers .104 
102 Pub. L. No. 637. 88 Stat. 2183 (1974). 
103 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975). 
10• 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(I) (Supp. V 1975). 
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Congres.s was aware of the limitations of economic analysis and 
the costs borne by interested parties when agency rulemaking is 
delayed. The House Report states: 
The Committee wishes to emphasize that the requirements 
for the FTC's statement which accompanies the adoption of a 
rule are incorporated for the purpose of permitting a better 
understanding of the terms o(the rule and the reasons for the 
rule on the part of the public .... In particular, the require-
ment that the statement include statements as to the economic 
impact of the rule does not require the Commission to under-
take a full scale economic investigation prior to promulgation of 
the rule. To do this would inordinately delay FTC proceedings 
and deny relief to the consuming public while indefinite ques-
tions of economic prediction were resolved by the Commission. 
This provision should be read to require that the Commission 
consider the economic impacts of the rule to issues and sum-
marize its best estimate of that impact in the statement. Obvi-
ously, a full evaluation of the economic impact of the rule would 
have to await its promulgation. 105 
The prospect of delay caused by the requirement of a statement 
of economic effect is further reduced by the provisions for judicial 
review. The statement of basis and purpose is part of the "rule mak-
ing record" 106 which the courts review in deciding whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the FfC action. However, the 
"contents and adequacy" of the statement are not "subject to 
judicial review in any respect." 107 Thus, the statement can aid in 
justifying the.FTC's decision, but it presumably cannot undermine 
that decision. 
The economic analysis required by the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act and the statement of economic effect which must accom-
105 H.R. REP. No. I 107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 7702, 7729. 
106 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1975). 
107 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(5)(C) (Supp. V 1975). 
An alternate method of denying judicial review is illustrated by a case arising under Exec. 
Order No. 11821, supra note 22, which requires an evaluation of the inflationary impact of 
all major legislative proposals, rules, and regulations emanating from the executive branch 
of the federal government. The Department of Agriculture promulgated regulations revising 
USDA standards for the grades of carcass beef and slaughter cattle. 7 C. F.R. §§ 53.102, 
53.104-.105. 53.203-.206 (1975). The Independent Meat Packers Association challenged 
these regulations. alleging, inter alia, that the regulations were issued in viplation of Exec. 
Order No. I 1821. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction which was affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals. Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz. 514 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 
1975) (per curiam). The District Court subsequently granted a permanent injunction finding 
that there was "material and substantial noncompliance with the mandate of Executive 
Order No. 11821." 395 F. Supp. 923, 932 (D. Neb. 1975). The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Exec. Order No. 11821 '"was intended primarily as a 
managerial tool for implementing the President's personal economic policies and not as a 
legal framework enforceable by private civil action." 526 F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976). 
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pany a rule promulgated pursuant to that Act are not similar to 
those involved in the environmental impact statement process. 
There is no public comment on the statement as it is being prepared 
and there is no judicial review of the adequacy of the completed 
statement. To prevent confusion between the different procedures, 
the economic analysis required by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act should be labeled as an economic assessment rather than as an 
economic impact statement. 
This method of economic assessment, disclosing the anticipated 
economic impact of the agency action, is superior to the statement 
required by the Economic Impact Disclosure Act in several re-
spects. The agency actions which trigger formal economic analysis 
are appropriate.ly quite limited. Rather than requiring all state 
agencies to prepare a statement for a broad spectrum of their 
activities, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act applies only to a 
single agency and requires the statement for rulemaking in one 
specific area. This approach offers several advantages. A limited 
number of statements will be produced, rather than the flood of 
EcIS's resulting from the broader proposal, and the legislature can 
designate the particular types of agency activity in which economic 
considerations deserve particular attention. Moreover, fewer 
agency resources will be required for preparation of an assessment. 
In addition, hopefully, the assessments will receive closer scrutiny 
than would be the case with a broader requirement. 
Denying judicial review of the content and adequacy of an 
economic assessment is another advantage. The potential for delay 
is too great to justify judicial review in light of the limited effect of 
either economic assessment or impact statements upon the 
decision-making process. The courts, even more than the FTC, are 
not well equipped to handle "indefinite questions of economic 
prediction." 108 The resources of the agencies and interested par-
ties can be more efficiently allocated to examination of the substan-
tive decisions and the justifications for the decisions and biases of 
the decision-maker, rather than to preparation of a statement 
which does not significantly affect the choice of an alternative and 
which obscures some of the important factors influencing that 
choice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Economic Impact Disclosure Act is a response to the per-
ceived failure of state agencies to consider adequately the 
10• See text accompanying note 105 supra. 
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economic effects of their activities upon consumers and the busi-
ness community. The Act would force agencies to present an 
economic analysis of the impact of their actions and would allow 
aggrieved parties to seek judicial review of the EclS to protect the 
integrity of the process. Thus, the Act is designed to reduce the 
problems arising from the discretion of state agencies and to make 
the decision-making process more responsive to the public inter-
est. 
However, the Economic Impact Disclosure Act is a poor way to 
achieve those goals. The statute includes far too many agency 
activities within its scope and could substantially delay agency 
response to pressing problems. But beyond the definitional prob-
lems, economic impact statements would not be an effective 
method of controlling agency discretion. Rather than providing an 
objective determination of the desirability of agency activity, the 
EcIS will reflect the ideology and bias of the agency. In addition, as 
a procedural method of controlling the agency, the Act ignores the 
realities of the decision-niaking process. In the hope of increasing 
the rationality of the agency decisions, the Act requires a process 
peripheral to the political forces and organizational values which 
form a substantial part of the basis for agency decisions. The cost 
of EcIS preparation, in terms of agency resources and time, clearly 
outweighs any benefit the statement might produce in the 
decision-making process. 
Economic analysis can be useful as a check on agency discre-
tion, but it should take the form of an assessment of predicted 
impacts. The purpose should be seen as disclosure to the legisla-
ture and to the public of the factors influencing agency decision-
making. Economic assessment can allow interested parties to un-
derstand the basis for a decision, but the economic effects alone 
will rarely explain why an agency prefers a particular alternative. 
Since economic assessment can adequately serve the more modest 
goal of disclosure, the procedural protections designed to ensure 
the integrity of the process should be correspondingly limited. 
-William F. Flynn 
